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Data Privacy and the Financial Services Industry: A
Federal Approach to Consumer Protection
I. INTRODUCTION
Industry leaders are no longer asking if a comprehensive federal
data privacy law should be implemented; instead the question has shifted
to how it should be implemented. 1 In response to a growing number of
data breaches 2 and the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation 3 (“GDPR”), states are adopting their own data privacy
legislation. These state changes have led to a patchwork of state laws that
U.S. companies are struggling to satisfy. 4 To unify the patchwork of data
privacy laws across the U.S., lawmakers have introduced numerous
federal privacy proposals over the past year. 5 Committees in both the
House and Senate have sought feedback from stakeholders to evaluate

1. The technology industry as well as CEOs of financial services companies are calling
on Congress to pass a federal privacy bill. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, Business Roundtable CEOs
Call on Congress to Pass Comprehensive Nationwide Consumer Data Privacy Law, (Sept.
10, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-ceos-call-on-congressto-pass-comprehensive-nationwide-consumer-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/4VMMBFW8] (explaining industry stakeholders’ support of a federal privacy legislation); David
Meyer, In the Wake of GDPR, Will the U.S. Embrace Data Privacy, FORTUNE (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://fortune.com/2018/11/29/federal-data-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/MM3L-XKAA]
(discussing businesses’ support of federal data privacy legislation because of the confusing
patchwork of privacy laws currently in place).
2. See Zachary N. Layne, Note, The Modern Threat: Data Breaches, Security Measures,
and a Call for Changes, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 159, 160–62 (2019) (discussing recent data
breaches experienced by many industries).
3. The European Union (“EU”) effectuated comprehensive privacy legislation, the
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), in May 2018. EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L119).
4. See Joseph J. Lazzarotti et al., State Law Developments in Consumer Privacy,
JACKSON
LEWIS
(Mar.
15,
2019),
https://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/2019/03/articles/consumer-privacy/state-lawdevelopments-in-consumer-privacy/ [ https://perma.cc/P8M2-7QQJ] (explaining changes in
state data privacy laws); see also Elizabeth Feld, Note, United States Data Privacy Law: The
Domino Effect After the GDPR, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. Part V (2020) (discussing the effects
of the GDPR on financial institutions’ privacy compliance efforts).
5. See Lazzarotti, supra note 4 (discussing data privacy legislative proposals at the state
level).
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legislative solutions, 6 while the Federal Trade Commission 7 (“FTC”) has
held hearings to help shape the legislative debate. 8
Although banks are currently subject to the privacy provisions of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 9 (“GLBA”), banks often gather
consumer information that is not protected by the GLBA; this is the type
of consumer data that should be protected by a comprehensive federal
privacy law. 10 Such comprehensive federal privacy legislation should
preempt state privacy laws to avoid inefficiencies associated with the
industry’s compliance with a patchwork of state laws. 11 However, a
federal data privacy law that preempts state laws should have strong data
protections to maintain consumer trust. 12 While the GLBA has helped
6. See Neil Haggerty, Top Senators Seek Input on How to Strengthen Data Privacy, AM.
BANKER (Feb. 13, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/top-senatorsseek-input-on-how-to-strengthen-data-privacy [https://perma.cc/45MB-FG5D] (discussing
lawmakers’ efforts to pass federal privacy legislation).
7. The FTC and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) are two federal
agencies that jointly enforce the consumer privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999 (“GLBA”), a federal law that provides protections to consumers of financial
institutions. Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a) (2018). The
FTC enforces the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule (“Privacy Rule”) of the
GLBA, which applies to non-bank financial institutions, 16 C.F.R. § 313.1 (2018), and the
CFPB enforces the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Regulation (“Regulation P”)
of the GLBA, which applies to banking financial institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 1016.1 (2018). Both
privacy regulations have similar requirements. Id.; 16 C.F.R. § 313.1.
8. The FTC held informational hearings on data security and privacy issues in December
2018 and in April 2019. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Hearing 12: The FTC’s Approach to
Consumer Privacy (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/ftchearing-competition-consumer-protection-21st-century-february-2019
[https://perma.cc/2RV4-4X7K].
9. The GLBA only applies to “nonpublic personal information.” 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a).
10. Julie Bernard, Consumer Data Privacy: Why We Need a Single (Federal) Law,
FORBES
(Mar.
29,
2019,
6:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2019/03/29/consumer-data-privacy-whywe-need-a-single-federal-law/#1bd94e43623f [https://perma.cc/27C4-JE3C] (advocating for
federal legislation that protects personal data).
11. See Joe Rubin, Banks Must Brace for Renewed Privacy Fight, AM. BANKER (Dec. 20,
2018, 10:01 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banks-must-brace-for-renewedprivacy-fight [https://perma.cc/RA9B-MUMT] (addressing the difficulty of adding
preemption to federal data privacy legislation).
12. See Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Notice of
Request for Public Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 187, 48600 (proposed Sept. 26, 2018) (“Trust is
at the core of the United States’ privacy policy formation.”). Public concern of privacy and
security on the Internet could hinder the growth of the digital economy. NAT’L TELECOMM.
& INFO. ADMIN, Most Americans Continue to Have Privacy and Security Concerns, NTIA
Survey Finds, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.: BLOG (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2018/most-americans-continue-have-privacy-and-securityconcerns-ntia-survey-finds [https://perma.cc/UD7J-QGYC] (“[P]rivacy concerns may lead to
lower levels of economic productivity as people decline to make financial transactions on the
Internet. . . . [A]t least a third of online households have been deterred from certain forms of
online activity, such as financial transactions, due to privacy and security concerns.”).
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consumers trust banks with their data, 13 it is unclear how long consumers
will trust financial institutions if consumers continue to fall victim to data
breaches and lose confidence in banks’ information sharing practices. 14
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II discusses the case for
preemption of the current patchwork of state data privacy laws and the
role of the GLBA in a federal privacy framework. 15 Part III analyzes the
scope of federal privacy legislation through the definition of personal data
and its effect on financial institutions. 16 Part IV explores the user control
rights that federal privacy law should require banks to provide
consumers. 17 Part V evaluates how a comprehensive federal data privacy
law can impose external accountability on financial institutions through
various enforcement efforts. 18 Part VI concludes this Note. 19
II. PREEMPTION OF STATE DATA PRIVACY LAWS AND AMENDING THE
GLBA
Preemption is a divisive and high-stakes issue because it impacts
all aspects of existing and future privacy law. 20 There are two ways to

13. See Voters Are Clear: Banks Are Trusted with Personal Data, BANK POL’Y INST.,
https://bpi.com/dataprivacy/ [https://perma.cc/B95S-VTV7] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019)
(describing survey results showing that consumer voters were “[three times] more likely to
trust banks and financial institutions to collect and protect their personal data than they are
technology companies”); see also A.T. KEARNEY, Key Findings from the Consumer Digital
Behavior Study (Apr. 2018), https://www.atkearney.com/financial-services/the-consumerdata-privacy-marketplace/the-consumer-digital-behavior-study
[https://perma.cc/8RAC4KNQ] (“Consumers view banks as their best agent in protecting consumer data privacy and
security.”).
14. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (“NTIA”) conducted a national survey in 2017 that found consumer concerns
related to Internet transactions included “identity theft, credit card or banking fraud, data
collection by online services, loss of control over personal information, data collection by
government, and threats to personal safety.” NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN, supra note
12. While data breach notification is an important issue in the data privacy and security
debate, this Note does not address data breach requirements in the context of future federal
data privacy law. Id.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.
20. See Abbie Gruwell, Preemption Takes Center Stage Amid Federal Data Privacy
Action, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES: NCSL BLOG (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/blog/2019/04/08/preemption-takes-center-stage-amid-federal-dataprivacy-action.aspx [https://perma.cc/5P7P-48PG] (discussing the significance of preemption
in the privacy debate).
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approach federal preemption of existing privacy laws. 21 A federal data
privacy law can preempt state data privacy laws by establishing a
ceiling 22 or serving as a federal baseline that allows for stricter state
laws. 23 For example, the GLBA has an anti-preemption provision that
sets a federal statutory floor, allowing states to pass more stringent state
laws. 24 Additionally, a federal data privacy law can affect existing
federal sectoral data privacy laws, such as the GLBA, by exempting
entities covered by existing sectoral laws from compliance with the new
federal law. 25 Conversely, a new federal law could require covered
entities to comply with the new federal law in addition to the existing
sectoral privacy law, and where the laws conflict, the covered entities
would have to follow the stricter law. 26 Since stakeholders seek
uniformity in their privacy compliance efforts, lawmakers should resolve
the question of preemption of state laws and conflicting federal laws so
that stakeholders effectively understand their privacy obligations. 27
A.

Preemption of State Data Privacy Laws

The concept of preemption has often baffled legislators because
it is a “more intricate and highly contested provision” of lawmakers’
legislative proposals. 28 Consequently, few legislative proposals for a
comprehensive federal privacy law include provisions that preempt state
21. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption & Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 946 (2009)
(explaining the possible approaches to federal preemption in context of privacy law).
22. The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) establishes a federal ceiling that
preempts all state and local laws. National Labor Relations Act §§ 1–19 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§
151–169 (2018); see also Schwartz, supra note 21, at 928 (discussing the NLRA’s legislative
challenges because of its preemption provisions).
23. See Schwartz, supra note 21 (discussing the different ways lawmakers can design
preemption provisions of federal laws); see also Danielle K. Citron, The Privacy
Policymaking of Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 801–03 (2016) (explaining
preemption of state law and the role of state attorneys general (“AG”) in privacy enforcement
generally). The GLBA is an example of a federal law that establishes a minimum level of
legal protections and requirements and allows for states to impose more stringent laws.
Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6807 (2018).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 6807.
25. See Citron, supra note 23 (explaining preemption of state law and the role of state
attorneys general in privacy enforcement).
26. Id.
27. See Gruwell, supra note 20 (discussing the significance of preemption in the privacy
debate).
28. Caitlin Chin & Marla Odell, Highlights: Where Stakeholders Fall in the Privacy
Debate,
BROOKINGS
INST.:
TECHTANK
BLOG
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/09/17/highlights-where-stakeholders-fall-inthe-privacy-debate/ [https://perma.cc/6ZDL-AW7K].
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data privacy laws, 29 as states have taken varying approaches to consumer
protection by adopting a patchwork of legislation. 30
The California Consumer Privacy Act 31 (“CCPA”) is currently
the most protective comprehensive state data privacy law in the country. 32
As of October 2019, sixteen other states have introduced comprehensive
state privacy bills to enhance consumer data protections of their
residents. 33 Many state data privacy bills give consumers a private right
of action. 34 Other state laws provide for consumers’ rights to access
personal information collected and shared with third-parties, to deletion
of their data, to data portability, and to opt out of the sale of personal
information. 35 Additionally, as of October 2019, twelve state privacy
laws, including the CCPA, require covered entities to provide privacy
notices. 36 The CCPA and ten other state laws prohibit discrimination
against consumers who exercise their privacy rights. 37 Several state data

29. Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act (“Data Control Act”), H.R.
2013, 116th Cong. (2019); Balancing the Rights of Web Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act
of 2019 (“Web Surfers Act”), S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019); see John Hendel & Cristiano
Lima, Lawmakers Wrangle over Consumer Lawsuits as Privacy Talks Drag, POLITICO (June
5, 2019, 11:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/05/privacy-advocatesconsumer-lawsuits-1478824 [https://perma.cc/9RLX-E8MC] (describing the different
approaches and challenges lawmakers face in drafting privacy proposals).
30. See Mitchell Noordyke, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L
ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROFS., https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/
[https://perma.cc/8T7V-BV3J] (last updated Oct. 15, 2019) (evaluating state data privacy
laws).
31. Although enacted in 2018, the CCPA will go into effect on January 1, 2020.
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.198
(West 2018); see also John Stephens, California Consumer Privacy Act, ABA (July 2, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/
2019/201902/fa_9/ [https://perma.cc/V3MY-KZ7F] (overview of CCPA requirements and
implications for businesses).
32. See Lauren Davis, Note, The Impact of the California Consumer Privacy Act on
Financial Institutions Across the Nation, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. Part V (2020) (discussing
the effect of the CCPA on financial institutions’ privacy compliance efforts).
33. See Noordyke, supra note 30 (tracking state data privacy efforts); see also Lazzarotti
et al., supra note 4 (explaining changes in state data privacy laws).
34. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.198 (West 2018); Louisiana Internet
and Social Media Privacy and Protection Act, H.B. 465, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (La.
2019); NYPA, S.B. S5642, 2019–2020, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Pennsylvania Consumer Data
Privacy Act, H.B. 1049, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019); Rhode Island
Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S.B. S0234, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I.
2019); see also Noordyke, supra note 30 (comparing state data privacy laws).
35. See Noordyke, supra note 30 (evaluating state data privacy proposals).
36. See id. (discussing trends among state data privacy legislation).
37. See id. (analyzing state data privacy proposals).
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privacy bills further impose unique obligations on companies, such as
mandatory data privacy assessments 38 and fiduciary duty requirements. 39
Some argue that federal privacy legislation should not preempt
state laws because each state serves as a “laboratory” of democracy that
experiment with innovative approaches to protect its citizens. 40
However, a uniform federal regulatory approach would be more
appropriate because of “the inherently interstate nature of electronic
commerce and associated data breaches.” 41 Preemption is crucial to the
federal data privacy law debate because one federal law would greatly
simplify industry compliance efforts in the long run by establishing
uniform national standards. 42
Further, a federal standard would ensure that consumers receive
the same privacy rights and data protections regardless of where they may
live. 43 Privacy legislation should balance the convenience gained from
preempting state laws against the potential loss of strong consumer
protections afforded by state data privacy laws. 44 To serve both the
interests of the banking industry and its consumers, lawmakers should
enact a comprehensive federal data privacy law with robust consumer

38. See, e.g., Minnesota Privacy Act, H. F. 2917, 2019–2020 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn.
2019); Washington Privacy Act, S.B. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
39. See, e.g., NYPA, S.B. S5642, 2019-2020 N.Y. State Senate, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
40. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see also Privacy Preemption Watch, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/preemption/ [https://perma.cc/J8GC-ST9P] (last visited Oct. 19,
2019) (addressing the influence of state data privacy laws on the evolution of data privacy
rights).
41. Alden F. Abbot, The Federal Trade Commission’s Role in Online Security: Data
Protector
or
Dictator?,
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Sept.
10,
2014),
https://www.heritage.org/report/the-federal-trade-commissions-role-online-security-dataprotector-or-dictator [https://perma.cc/VCS4-Y5YU].
42. Alan McQuinn & Daniel Castro, A Grand Bargain on Data Privacy Legislation for
America, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 13 (Jan. 2019) http://www2.itif.org/2019-grandbargain-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTS7-G8E4] (discussing the benefits of preemption in
context of a federal data privacy law).
43. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, Comment Letter to the Senate’s Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Request for Information about the Protection of Consumer
Information
(Mar.
15,
2019),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Data%20Submission_American%20Banker
s%20Association%20(ABA)1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4T8-TTHY].
44. See Adam J. Levitt & Amy E. Keller, Insight: Cyber Wolves in CEOs’ ClothingBusiness Leaders Thwart Privacy Efforts, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 9, 2019, 4:01 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/insight-cyber-wolves-in-ceosclothing-business-leaders-thwart-privacy-efforts
[https://perma.cc/EVX8-MVUS]
(discussing consumer privacy protections that CEOs urge be included in federal data privacy
legislation).
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protections that expressly preempts existing state data privacy laws. 45
Therefore, a federal data privacy law should include the most protective
aspects of state laws to avoid watering down consumer protections. 46
Conversely, opponents argue that a broadly preemptive federal
privacy law would be difficult to enact and amend. 47 An expressly
preemptive federal privacy law would be difficult to enact because
preemption is a divisive issue that lawmakers have not been able to
settle. 48 Furthermore, a preemptive federal law would be challenging to
amend because industry stakeholders and consumer advocates could get
congressional support and interfere with efforts to change it. 49 However,
one way to combat this is to include a “sunset provision” 50 that would
allow legislators to consider the law’s effectiveness and address issues
that may have arisen since implementation. 51 For example, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) contained a series of sunset provisions. 52
When those sunset provisions neared expiration, Congress amended the
FCRA with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act in 2003 to
increase the law’s protections. 53 A sunset provision that sets a time limit
on federal preemption can serve as “a safeguard against regulatory
ossification” 54 in the face of rapidly changing technologies. 55

45. See id. (advocating for comprehensive consumer protections in future federal data
privacy legislation).
46. See Chin & Odell, supra note 28 (“While some panelists positioned a preemptive
federal law as beneficial for both businesses and consumers, through setting clear and uniform
rules across the nation; they also emphasized that any preemptive law would need to be
substantial enough to protect consumers.”); see also Levitt & Keller, supra note 44
(discussing the need for privacy legislation to have strong protections like the CCPA to avoid
a watered-down bill that gives the appearance of protecting consumers).
47. See Gruwell, supra note 20 (discussing the significance of preemption in the privacy
debate); Schwartz, supra note 21, at 928 (addressing the challenges of preemptive federal
laws).
48. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 928 (explaining the obstacles lawmakers face to enact
preemptive federal data privacy legislation).
49. Additionally, such legislation would likely “become outdated as technological
changes undermine such a statute’s regulatory assumptions.” See id. at 946.
50. A sunset provision is a provision that will expire after a certain amount of time. See
id. at 946 (addressing sunset provisions in the context of preemption).
51. See id. at 945 (discussing sunset provisions as a way to draft preemptive statutes).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 946.
54. Ossification “means a lack of meaningful changes over time within and without [the
federal statute] in response to new conditions” as it relates to a federal statute’s preemption
of state laws. Id. at 928 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 946.
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Amending the GLBA

The U.S. has a sectoral approach to federal privacy regulation,
which means that privacy laws only apply to certain industries, like the
GLBA’s application to financial institutions. 56 Although consumers of
financial institutions have benefitted from the GLBA’s privacy
protections, the Act has come under scrutiny. 57 To comply with the
GLBA, financial institutions must “respect the privacy of its customers
and . . . protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’
nonpublic personal information.” 58 The GLBA defines consumers’
“nonpublic personal information” to be “personally identifiable financial
information” that a financial institution obtains related to providing a
financial product or service to an individual, unless that data is otherwise
available to the public. 59
Despite the GLBA’s privacy protections, the Act’s narrow scope
excludes other kinds of personal information collected and used by
financial institutions, information that should be protected as well. 60 For
example, financial institutions gather information about visitors to their
websites or mobile applications for visits unrelated to financial services
or opening of an account. 61 Banks may then use that consumer data
internally for marketing purposes and externally by selling that
information to third parties. 62 Additionally, the GLBA does not protect
information connected to data use related to marketing or data analytics. 63
56. See Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Notice of
Request for Public Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 187, 48602 (proposed Sept. 26, 2018) (“For users
of products and services in several sectors (e.g., healthcare, education, financial services),
specific laws cover how organizations handle personal information. Where no sector-specific
laws apply, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the authority to ensure that
organizations are not deceiving consumers or operating unfairly.”).
57. See Luke Dembosky et al., The California Consumer Privacy Act: Compliance
Strategies for Financial Institutions, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON 1 (May 2, 2019),
https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2019/04/the-california-consumer-privacyact [https://perma.cc/29ZS-GY8V] (discussing the effects of the CCPA on financial
institutions and compliance considerations).
58. Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2018).
59. Id. § 6809(4); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1016.1–.17 (2018) (setting forth the CFPB’s financial
privacy rule, Regulation P, which regulates banks privacy practices).
60. See Dembosky et al., supra note 57 (addressing the consequences of the CCPA on
privacy practices of financial institutions).
61. Id.
62. See id. (explaining information that falls outside of the CCPA’s GLBA exemption).
63. See id. (discussing the effects of the CCPA on financial institutions subject to the
GLBA and their compliance considerations). Data analytics involves analyzing raw data
using algorithms to draw conclusions about that data. Avantika Monnappa, Data Science Vs.
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The Act excludes information about financial institutions’ job applicants,
contractors, and employees. 64 Further, while the GLBA ensures that
customers have an opportunity to “opt out” of data transfers to
unaffiliated parties of financial institutions, it provides multiple
exceptions to the opt-out requirement that allow financial institutions to
ignore a customer’s request to not have her data transferred to nonaffiliates. 65
Future federal legislation should address the shortcomings of the
GLBA either by amending the GLBA provisions related to data privacy, 66
providing carve-outs for GLBA provisions related to data privacy, 67 or
doing a combination of both. 68 For instance, lawmakers could adopt a
compromised approach to provide robust protections for consumers and
ease compliance challenges. 69 This approach could preempt state laws,
like the CCPA, while incorporating the CCPA’s approach to defining
personal information 70 and providing a limited carve-out for the GLBA. 71
The CCPA provides a GLBA exemption for financial institutions subject
to GLBA data protection requirements. 72 Such a compromised approach
would allow banks to continue complying with the GLBA’s privacy
provisions while requiring them to satisfy the parts of the CCPA that
protects consumer data not covered by the GLBA. 73

Big
Data
Vs.
Data
Analytics,
SIMPLILEARN
(Aug.
26,
2019),
https://www.simplilearn.com/data-science-vs-big-data-vs-data-analytics-article
[https://perma.cc/G34A-4SGC].
64. Dembosky et al., supra note 57.
65. Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2) (2018); see
also
The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act,
ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY
INFO.
CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/glba/ [https://perma.cc/SF9C-NJ8A] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019)
(discussing problems with consumer data protection under GLBA).
66. Rubin, supra note 11.
67. Based on amendments to the CCPA in September 2018, the CCPA provides entities
covered by the GLBA a limited exemption by exempting from the CCPA “personal
information collected, processed, sold or disclosed” under the GLBA and its implementing
regulations. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.145(e) (West 2018).
68. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 904 (addressing different approaches lawmakers can
take to address preemption).
69. Id.
70. See infra Part III for analysis of the definition of personal information.
71. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 904; see also Dembosky et al., supra note 57 (explaining
the CCPA-related compliance challenges that financial institutions will face).
72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(e).
73. See Dembosky et al., supra note 57 (addressing challenges financial institutions will
face under the CCPA).
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Although tracking GLBA-covered information makes
compliance more difficult for financial institutions, banks should weigh
those difficulties against the ease of compliance of a federal data privacy
law which preempts state laws. 74 Ultimately, a strong comprehensive
federal privacy law should replace the aspects of the GLBA that relate to
data privacy only if it provides consumers with stronger protections. 75
III. AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION AND ENTITIES COVERED UNDER
THE GLBA
In order to justify preemption of state data privacy laws and
amending the GLBA’s privacy provisions, future data privacy legislation
should include clear and all-encompassing definitions of the data and
entities covered. 76 Broad definitions under federal data privacy
legislation will protect a large swath of consumer personal data and
ensure that preemption of state laws does not erode consumer
protections. 77 Because federal regulators have suggested implementing
a risk-based data privacy framework, which would implement safeguards
based on the sensitivity of the information, lawmakers should extend this
concept to the definitions of personal information. 78 Federal privacy
legislation should distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive
personal information in their definitions of personal information. 79 The
scope of the definition of personal information is important, as it will
affect how companies engage in commercial activity and innovation. 80
Therefore, lawmakers should balance a broad definition of personal
information with tiers of privacy requirements based on the sensitivity of
consumer information. 81
This approach of providing protections based on the risk level of
data is a calculated method of balancing compliance costs against
74. Financial institutions should recognize that a uniform regulatory approach to all
categories of personal information would better protect their consumers. See id. (discussing
the effects of the CCPA on financial institutions and compliance considerations).
75. See id. (explaining CCPA compliance challenges).
76. See id. (evaluating the effects of data privacy legislation on financial institutions).
77. See id. (comparing the scope of CCPA and GLBA).
78. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Hearing 12: April 10 Session 2 Remarks by FTC
Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Session 1 Presentations on Data Breaches (Apr.
10, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/video/ftc-hearing-12-april-10session-2-remarks-ftc-commissioner-rebecca [https://perma.cc/8X4H-CKVQ].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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consumer benefits. 82 Researchers have noted that increased privacy
protections do not necessarily lead to increased digital trust and use by
consumers. 83 Consequently, legislators should not require the industry to
provide the same high level of protection to both sensitive and nonsensitive data because such an approach would unnecessarily overburden
financial institutions. 84
Current legislative proposals, however, have provided limited
definitions of information covered. 85 The Information Transparency and
Personal Data Control Act 86 (“Data Control Act”) defines sensitive
information as “information relating to an identified or identifiable
individual,” including government created identification, verification
credentials, call records, biometric data, sexual preferences, and
religion. 87 “Sensitive information” excludes behavioral information,
such as a user’s web and app usage, geolocation data, and email address. 88
Slightly more inclusive than the Data Control Act, the Social Media
Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019 89 (“Consumer
Rights Act”) defines personal information more broadly as “individually
identifiable information about an individual collected online.” 90 This
definition includes nonpublic personal information under the GLBA, 91
82. See McQuinn & Castro, supra note 42, at 5 (“Policymakers getting [the] balance
[between privacy protections and innovation] wrong can deter innovation and harm
consumers because overly stringent regulation raises costs and reduces the relative quality of
digital technologies, thereby negatively impact the people who use them.”).
83. See id. (“Privacy and security protections are important because rules that are too
weak can make users feel uneasy about adopting technologies and services. However, beyond
a baseline of protections, stronger privacy protections do not translate into more digital trust
and therefore more digital adoption and use.”).
84. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (explaining the advantages and
disadvantages of a risk-based approach to privacy protections).
85. See Lazzarotti et al., supra note 4 (discussing changes in state data privacy laws).
86. Representative Suzan K. DelBene (D-WA) first introduced this bill on September 20,
2018. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. (2019). She reintroduced this bill on March
29, 2019. Id.
87. Id.
88. The Data Control Act does not address the GLBA directly, but it does mention the
GLBA indirectly by protecting state laws that impose stronger requirements on financial
institutions than the GLBA. Id.
89. Senators John Kennedy (R-LA) and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) first introduced the
Consumer Rights Act on April 23, 2018. Social Media Privacy and Consumer Rights Act of
2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019). They reintroduced this bill again on January 17, 2019. Id.
90. Id.
91. Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4) (2018). The
Consumer Rights Act’s incorporation of the GLBA’s definition of nonpublic personal
information is this bill’s only mention of the GLBA, and presumably, this means that financial
institutions would have to continue to comply with the GLBA. Social Media Privacy and
Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019).
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protected health information under the Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 92 (“HIPAA”), and location information that
would identify the name of a consumer’s street and a city, a physical
address, an email address, and a telephone number. 93 Although the
Consumer Rights Act protects more kinds of consumer personal data,
legislators should ensure that a future definition of personal information
is expansive enough to protect consumers across a sufficient range of
business activities. 94
Furthermore, a federal data privacy law should define and address
sensitive personal data as a subset of personal information that should
receive additional protections, similar to the Data Control Act and the
Balancing the Rights of Web Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act of
2019 95 (“BROWSER Act”). 96 Both bills provide separate definitions and
protections for sensitive personal information, which is information that
personally identifies an individual, and non-sensitive personal
information, which is anonymized or publicly available data. 97 However,
both the BROWSER Act and the Data Control Act afford little protection
for non-sensitive personal information. 98
Non-sensitive personal
information should receive protection under a preemptive federal data
privacy law because many consumers value the privacy of their nonsensitive information as well. 99 A distinction between sensitive personal
data and personal information will help ensure that the financial services
industry is efficiently protecting its consumers’ data. 100
In order to preempt other laws without significantly reducing
consumer protections, Congress should consider the most expansive
definition of covered data currently at the state-level, which is presently
the definition of “personal information” under the CCPA. 101 The
92.
93.
94.
95.

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
Social Media Privacy and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong.
Id.
Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) introduced the BROWSER Act on April 10, 2019.
BROWSER Act, S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019).
96. The BROWSER Act states that it would not supersede any existing federal privacy
laws; therefore, if this bill passes, financial institutions would have to continue to comply with
the GLBA. Id.
97. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong.; BROWSER Act, S. 1116, 116th Cong.
98. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.140(o)(1) (West 2018); see Davis, supra note 32 (addressing the impact of the CCPA
on financial institutions).
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CCPA’s definition covers “information that identifies, relates to,
describes, or is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.” 102
Therefore, the CCPA’s expansive scope applies to nearly every kind of
information a business could collect about an individual. 103 Federal
privacy legislation should include such an expansive definition of
personal data. 104 Although compliance with this definition will be
challenging for financial institutions, it is a worthwhile compromise to
avoid the substantial difficulties banks would otherwise face navigating
a patchwork of state laws with varying requirements and definitions of
covered data. 105
IV. USER CONSENT AND USER RIGHTS TO ACCESS, WITHDRAW,
CORRECT, AND DELETE
User consent is a common theme across legislative proposals, 106
and federal data privacy legislation should include a robust user control
and consent framework. 107 User control and consent is a fundamental
aspect of establishing and maintaining consumer trust. 108 Consumers of
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1).
103. See Christopher A. Ott, Q&A: Privacy and Security Partner Christopher Ott on the

California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE: PRIVACY & SECURITY
L. BLOG
(Aug.
6,
2018),
https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy—security-lawblog/2018/08/qa-privacy-and-security-partner-christopher-ott-on
[https://perma.cc/M64V-D4QX] (“The CCPA applies to broadly defined personal
information of California residents collected by businesses, regardless of how the collection
is done, or the type of industry in which the business operates.”).
104. See id. (discussing compliance challenges presented by CCPA).
105. See id. (addressing legal issues presented by the CCPA and the GLBA).
106. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. (2019); Social Media Privacy and
Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019); Balancing the Rights of Web
Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act of 2019, S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019).
107. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (analyzing the benefits of the notice and
consent framework to provide transparency and a degree of user control in the context of
digital privacy).
108. See id. (discussing the history of the notice and consent framework and its role in
consumer protections); see also Pat Conroy et al., Building Consumer Trust, DELOITTE (Nov.
14, 2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/risk-management/consumer-dataprivacy-strategies.html
[https://perma.cc/9WVQ-JXJT] (“[Fifty-nine] percent of consumers state that the
knowledge of a data breach at a company would negatively impact their likelihood of buying
from that company.”). Although consumer consent is important for consumer trust, the
“privacy paradox” is relevant to consider. Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Privacy Policy
and Competition, Report, BROOKINGS INST. 7 (Dec. 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/ES-12.04.19-Marthews-Tucker.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CTBGKC4]. This phenomenon describes contradictory consumer behavior involving consumers
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the financial services industry should expect all industry stakeholders to
offer control over their data. 109 This requirement across industries will
increase consumer trust in online activities, an important source of
economic opportunity. 110 Many companies provide privacy protections
that generally require some degree of consent from consumers for a
company’s ability to use consumer information, and this can take the
form of “opt-in consent” or “opt-out consent.” 111
Opt-in consent is a stronger method of consumer control and
requires affirmative action by a user to explicitly grant a company
permission to use the consumer’s information. 112 For example, opt-in
consent often consists of a user clicking on a checkbox next to a statement
that says “I agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy,” or on a button
that says “I agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.” 113 On the
other hand, opt-out consent is passive consent, such that a consumer’s
consent to a company’s use of the consumer’s information is presumed,
unless the consumer affirmatively objects. 114 Opt-out consent could take
the form of a user unchecking a pre-checked box next to a statement of
agreement to undo the user’s assumed affirmation, or providing users
with the option to withdraw consent by clicking on a link, such as the
ubiquitous “unsubscribe” link in marketing emails. 115
Future federal data privacy should require companies to provide
consumers with the ability to opt out of businesses’ use of non-sensitive
personal data and to seek additional opt-in consent for sensitive consumer
data. 116 The Data Control Act, for instance, requires that companies, by
stating that they desire and value privacy, yet consumers do not behave in accordance with
their desires and frequently trade away their privacy for convenience, goods, or services. See
id. (“An illustration of the privacy paradox is, who show that though MIT students in general
acted in a way which accorded with their stated privacy preferences in terms of sharing
information, when these students were offered pizza they started sharing information even if
previously they had stated a greater preference for keeping their information private.”).
109. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (addressing the benefits of the providing
user control over personal data in the context of digital privacy).
110. See Conroy et al., supra note 108 (explaining the importance of trust for commercial
activity online).
111. KJ Dearie, Opt In vs Opt Out, TERMLY (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://termly.io/resources/articles/opt-in-vs-opt-out/
[https://perma.cc/PH35-JFNB]
(explaining the difference between opt-in and opt-out consent).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Bernard, supra note 10 (arguing for a comprehensive federal data privacy law).
The GLBA provides consumers of financial institutions the right to opt out of allowing
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default, obtain opt-in consent for collecting, using, or sharing users’
sensitive personal information, while providing users the right to opt out
of sharing their non-sensitive personal information. 117 Unlike other bills,
the Data Control Act provides a “reasonable expectation of users”
exception to the “opt-in consent” requirement. 118 Pursuant to this
exception, companies need not obtain such consent for the use of
“sensitive personal information or behavioral data” where this use “does
not deviate from purposes consistent with a [company’s] relationship
with users as understood by the reasonable user.” 119 This carve-out is so
expansive that it could defeat the opt-in consent requirements’s protective
purpose—companies could use it to cover their actions beyond data use
related to their operations. 120 Legislators should exercise caution in
providing such broad exemptions because a preemptive federal data
privacy law should not create gaps that weaken consumer rights to opt in
or opt out of sharing personal data. 121
Consumers should have the ability to control their personal data
with options to access, withdraw, correct, and delete their personal
data. 122 Existing federal sectoral privacy laws 123 and state laws 124 already
recognize the importance of providing consumers such rights. While the
provision of these rights may seem daunting to companies, they have
symbolic value that help strengthen companies’ relationships with their
financial institutions to share consumers’ nonpublic personal information with most nonaffiliated third parties. 12 C.F.R. § 1016.1(a)(3) (2018).
117. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also Levitt & Keller, supra note 44 (recommending consumer privacy
protections for federal data privacy legislation).
121. See id. (discussing consumer privacy protections for federal data privacy legislation).
122. See Mark Sullivan, As Google Turns 20, It Can’t Take Our Goodwill for Granted,
FAST COMPANY (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90243161/as-google-turns20-it-cant-take-our-goodwill-for-granted [https://perma.cc/48GX-TQTS] (discussing the
importance of transparency of consumer data).
123. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.524, 164.526 (2018) (outlining patient rights to request a copy
of protected health information and to amend protected health information under the privacy
rule of the HIPAA); But see 12 C.F.R. § 1016.1 (2018) (providing consumers the right to opt
out of sharing nonpublic personal information but does not provide consumers any right to
correct or receive a copy of nonpublic personal information under the GLBA’s Regulation P).
124. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §§
1798.100–1798.199 (West 2018) (providing consumers the right to access data collected and
shared); Pennsylvania Consumer Data Privacy Act, H.B. 1049, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019) (providing consumers the right to access data collected and shared);
Rhode Island Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S.B. S0234, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (R.I. 2019) (providing consumers the right to access data collected and shared); see also
Noordyke, supra note 30 (comparing of state data privacy laws).
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customers, particularly when companies use and share consumer data to
engage in marketing and to maintain partnerships with third party service
providers. 125
Although no federal legislative proposal provides consumers the
right to correct information about themselves, industry and regulatory
stakeholders generally support this right. 126 Additionally, the proposed
Consumer Rights Act 127 and several state laws 128 provide consumers the
right to delete their data. 129 Some federal data privacy proposals 130
provide users with the right to access the information a company has
about them and to withdraw consent provided earlier, which many
industry stakeholders support. 131 If federal data privacy legislation is to
preempt state laws, legislators should include these various rights to
control data to ensure a sufficiently robust federal privacy law that
provides rights comparable to those offered at the state level. 132 A

125. Sullivan, supra note 122.
126. Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Notice of Request

for Public Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 187, 48602 (proposed Sept. 26, 2018) (outlining the
Administration’s privacy goals and recommending that companies should provide reasonable
control to users, including the right to correct consumer information in certain circumstances);
Framework for Consumer Privacy Legislation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE 4 (Dec. 2018),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/privacy_report_PDF_005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JA464DBQ] (proposing user controls, such as the right to correct, in federal privacy legislation).
127. The Consumer Rights Act limits this right to instances where a user deletes their
account or otherwise terminates use of a company’s platform. Social Media Privacy and
Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019). Additionally, the Consumer
Rights Act allows consumers to request a company delete their personal information after a
company experiences a privacy breach. Id.
128. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.198.
129. Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. at
48602 (recommending that companies should provide reasonable control to users, which
includes the right to access, withdraw, correct, and delete consumer information in certain
circumstances); Framework for Consumer Privacy Legislation, supra note 126, at 4
(“Consumers should be able to require an organization to delete their personal data collected
by an organization, when such data is no longer required to be maintained under applicable
law or is no longer necessary for legitimate business purposes of the organization.”).
130. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(F) (2019); Social Media Privacy
Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. § 3(b) (2019).
131. Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Fed. Reg. at 48601
(advocating user data control rights); Framework for Consumer Privacy Legislation, supra
note 126, at 3 (proposing inclusion of user controls in future data privacy legislation).
132. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (providing consumers the right to access
data collected and shared); Pennsylvania Consumer Data Privacy Act, H.B. 1049, 2019–2020
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019) (providing consumers the right to access data collected
and shared); Rhode Island Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S.B. S0234, 2019–2020 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2019) (providing consumers the right to access data collected and
shared); see also Noordyke, supra note 30 (comparing state data privacy legislation).
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uniform set of rights will provide consumers control without
overburdening companies and interfering with their operations. 133
V. ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
A.

The FTC and State Attorneys General

Although other federal agencies may currently enforce the
privacy provisions of federal sectoral privacy laws, such as the CFPB’s
enforcement of the GLBA’s Regulation P, 134 stakeholders strongly
support making the FTC the primary enforcer of a federal data privacy
law. 135 Because of the FTC’s experience and existing role in protecting
data privacy across many industries, supporters argue that the FTC is best
positioned to enforce a comprehensive federal privacy law that would
apply across all industries. 136 The FTC uses its general authority under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”) to
protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. 137 In the
data privacy sphere, the FTC considers whether companies are engaging
in unfair and deceptive practices by using consumer data in a manner that
conflicts with the companies’ published privacy policies or related public

133. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78.
134. If legislators provide carve-outs for existing sector-specific federal privacy laws, such

as the GLBA, under a comprehensive federal privacy law, then federal agencies, such as the
CFPB, will continue to enforce the privacy provisions of their respective sector-specific
privacy laws. See supra Part II (discussing amendment of the GLBA).
135. Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. at
48602 (recommending the FTC be the primary enforcement agency); Balancing the Rights of
Web Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act of 2019, S. 1116, 116th Cong. § 6 (2019)
(designating the FTC as the primary enforcement agency); Social Media Privacy and
Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. § 4 (2019) (designating the FTC as the
primary enforcement agency); Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. § 4 (2019)
(designating the FTC as the primary enforcement agency); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-52, INTERNET PRIVACY: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL AUTHORITY
COULD ENHANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY 1 (2019) (offering an
overview of a range of stakeholders’ views of enforcement of federal privacy law); But see
David Meyer, Who Should Enforce a US Federal Privacy Law?, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS.
(Feb. 26, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/who-should-enforce-a-federal-privacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/2D72-8ZA8] (explaining that privacy advocates’ call for the creation of a
new agency to oversee data privacy enforcement of a federal privacy law).
136. See Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Fed. Reg. at
48602 (addressing the role of the FTC in future data privacy enforcement efforts).
137. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”) § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(2018).
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statements and whether companies are not delivering on their promises
to safeguard personal data from unauthorized use. 138
The FTC principally uses enforcement actions 139 against
organizations that fail to protect consumers’ privacy and personal data as
a way to end the unlawful behavior and to compel violators to remediate
their illegal actions. 140 For example, an FTC order can require companies
to adopt privacy and security programs, to conduct biennial assessments
by independent assessors to ensure compliance with settlement terms, or
to offer consumers tools for transparency and choice. 141 Additionally,
the FTC may obligate companies to compensate harmed consumers,
disgorge unlawful financial gains, or delete consumer data obtained
unlawfully. 142
However, the FTC’s limited ability to issue civil penalties
restricts its ability to enforce data privacy measures. 143 Furthermore, the
FTC does not have civil penalty authority 144 under Section 5 of the FTC
Act, meaning the FTC cannot impose direct civil penalties on
organizations for first-time violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 145 The
FTC may only seek civil penalties when an entity has violated a consent
order, a statute, or rule that explicitly provides for civil penalty
authority. 146

138. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 135, at 9–10 (explaining how the
FTC enforces data privacy).
139. The FTC’s data privacy enforcement activities consist of litigation and consent
decrees, similar to a settlement agreement. See id. (mentioning the different accountability
mechanisms the FTC uses in its data privacy efforts).
140. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2018 2 (2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update2018/2018-privacy-data-security-report-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ5P-3NNT].
For
example, the FTC found that Lenovo, a large computer manufacturing company, had violated
the safety of its customers’ information because Lenovo had pre-loaded software on its
laptops that displayed advertisements to its customers. Lenovo, Inc., 82 Fed. Reg. 43013,
43015
(Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 13, 2017) (Consent Agreement). Lenovo settled with the FTC and
had to provide consumers with certain security protections to allow them “to opt out, disable
or remove all of the covered software’s operations.” Id.
141. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 140.
142. Id.
143. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 135, at 1 (explaining restraints on
FTC enforcement powers).
144. See id. at 10, n.23 (“Civil penalty authority gives an agency the ability to seek a
monetary remedy from an entity that has violated a statute or regulation.”).
145. Id. at 20.
146. Id. at 10.
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Federal data privacy legislation should remedy this enforcement
gap by providing the FTC authority to impose civil penalties on
companies for first-time violations of Section 5. 147 Proponents state that
the FTC’s current financial payment and fining regime does not impose
high enough costs to adequately discourage bad behavior. 148 Many
businesses currently consider these FTC payments “a cost of doing
business.” 149 Civil penalties are a concrete method to keep companies
accountable to the law and will have an amplified deterrent effect on
companies in conjunction with the other payments the FTC can require
from violators. 150
In addition to FTC enforcement, federal data privacy legislation
should consider extending state Attorney General (“AG”) authority to
bring enforcement actions on behalf of their residents. 151 Some
legislative proposals include provisions granting AGs such authority. 152
Supporters of AG enforcement authority argue that enforcement
authority should not be too centralized and overburden one regulator,
especially considering the increased enforcement workload that will
inevitably result from a new federal privacy law. 153 Furthermore, AGs
are likely better equipped than the FTC to represent their residents’
interests in litigation. 154 AGs can effectively draw upon prior experience
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
See id. (explaining the role of penalties in FTC enforcement efforts); But see FED.
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (“[T]he FTC Act today does not include civil penalties for
first-time violations [because]. . . . [y]ou cannot marry an incredibly broad law that is
incredibly vague with the ability to impose penalties upon a company that simply fails to
predict where a line is drawn.”).
151. Meyer, supra note 135.
152. See, e.g., Social Media Privacy and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th
Cong. § 4(b) (2019); Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019).
153. See Meyer, supra note 135 (“There’s no way that one agency, even an emboldened
and better funded FTC, can really deal with what’s going on [in terms of data practices in the
marketplace].”) (quotation omitted); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (“[W]e really want
a situation where there’s lots of different regulators, like attorneys general, state attorneys
generals who are empowered to do the kinds of investigations that we need to have real
transparency and real accountability.”); Citron, supra note 23, at 799 (“Federal authorities
cannot attend to most privacy and security problems because their resources are limited and
their duties ever expanding.”).
154. See Meyer, supra note 135 (“[W]hen cases involve granular, geolocation-based
personalization or where the data practices of a mom-and-pop store are in question, it makes
sense for the states to play an important role.”); see e.g., Cary Silverman & Jonathan L.
Wilson, State Attorney General Enforcement of Unfair or Deceptive Trade Acts and Practices
Laws: Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 KAN. L. REV. 209, 257 (2016) (“Now, with
increased storage of consumer data and a rise in security breaches, state attorneys general and
147.
148.
149.
150.
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enforcing data privacy protections in their states as well as their local
expertise. 155 Although opponents worry that AG involvement may lead
“to over-enforcement [that] overwhelms companies,” 156 AG enforcement
is important to ensure that consumers’ interests are adequately protected
under a federal privacy law that preempts state privacy laws. 157
Otherwise, consumers would lose a large source of existing protection
through AG enforcement activity under the current regime. 158
B.

Private Right of Action

While some states provide consumers with a private right of
action, most notably the CCPA, 159 none of the current federal legislative
proposals offer this source of accountability to allow consumers to take
companies to court for federal privacy law violations. 160 A private right
of action is a legal mechanism that increases corporate liability and
further incentivizes companies to follow data privacy law. 161 Yet, some
critics of a private right of action consider FTC enforcement alone to be
more effective in keeping companies accountable than private law
claims. 162 These critics also state that private rights of action will lead to
frivolous litigation that will hinder innovation in the marketplace and
reduce resources that companies could use to safeguard consumer
privacy. 163

class action lawyers are increasingly bringing actions under state [unfair or deceptive trade
acts and practices] laws and other legal theories.”); Citron, supra note 23, at 799 (“If
enforcement were solely in the hands of federal agencies, local matters would surely be
overlooked. . . . [because] [t]he FTC has brought a little over fifty data security cases in the
past ten years due to limited resources.”).
155. Citron, supra note 23, at 801.
156. Id. at 796 (internal quotations and footnote omitted).
157. Id. at 798.
158. Id. (“State enforcers are essential to the efficient deterrence of privacy and data
security violations given the increasing marginalization of private law and the practical
constraints on federal agencies.”).
159. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–
1798.198 (West 2018); NYPA, S.B. S5642, 2019–2020, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Rhode Island
Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S.B. S0234, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb. (R.I. 2019).
160. See, e.g., Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. (2019); Social Media Privacy
and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019); Balancing the Rights of Web
Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act of 2019, S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019).
161. Hendel & Lima, supra note 29.
162. Id.
163. See McQuinn & Castro, supra note 42, at 61 (discussing the disadvantages of a
private right of action in privacy legislation); see also Hendel & Lima, supra note 29
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Despite these critiques, Congress should ultimately incorporate a
limited private right of action because tailored language and careful
drafting can alleviate opponents’ concerns about frivolous litigation. 164
Lawmakers can draft a narrow private right of action through statutory
design by limiting private lawsuits to breaches of certain kinds of
personal data, such as sensitive data. 165 Additionally, lawmakers can
impose statutory damages for violations of certain provisions of the
federal privacy law that are easier to comply with, like data access rights,
rather than for violations of any provision of the law. 166 Legislators can
also consider requiring that plaintiffs show tangible harm 167 or even
imposing an element of intent for statutory violations, such as willful
violations. 168 A limited private right of action can reduce industry
concerns about frivolous litigation while providing strong consumer
protections to justify preemption of existing privacy laws by a future
federal data privacy law. 169
A multi-level enforcement regime through state, federal, and
private enforcement activity will help correct existing litigation
challenges related to private law claims based on privacy harm. 170 Courts
impose high standards for plaintiffs to prove privacy harm and often

(explaining the political disagreements interfering with Congress’s ability to pass a
comprehensive federal data privacy law).
164. Hendel & Lima, supra note 29 (“Privacy advocates like the Electronic Frontier
Foundation say Republican concerns about excessive lawsuits can be addressed by careful
legislative drafting . . . .”).
165. Joseph Jerome, Private Right of Action Shouldn’t Be a Yes or No Proposition in
Federal Privacy Legislation, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://iapp.org/news/a/private-right-of-action-shouldnt-be-a-yes-no-proposition-in-federalprivacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/AF82-ZFBQ] (explaining ways legislators can limit a
private right of action in future federal privacy proposals).
166. Id.
167. However, privacy advocates argue that lawmakers should not limit redress for
privacy violations to “requiring a showing of a monetary loss or other tangible harm and
[instead] should make clear that the invasion of privacy itself is a concrete and individualized
injury.”
Public
Interest
Privacy
Legislation
Principles,
https://newamericadotorg.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Public_Interest_Privacy_Principle
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD8Z-P3CH] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
168. Jerome, supra note 165 (addressing limitations that lawmakers can impose on a
private right of action in future federal privacy legislation).
169. See Hendel & Lima, supra note 29 (“What would make the most sense is to have a
strong enforceable federal law[, said California state Sen. Hannah-Beth Jackson].”).
170. See also Citron, supra note 23 (discussing benefits of enforcement authority shared
between federal regulators and AGs in context of data privacy).
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dismiss claims based on lack of “injury in fact.” 171 As a result, courts
make it difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in privacy tort claims, 172
negligence claims, contract claims, and private claims based on state
unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices law. 173
Strong enforcement mechanisms help incentivize companies to
follow a future privacy law. 174 If a future federal privacy law will, in fact,
serve as the baseline for consumer privacy protections, legislators should
include public enforcement by the FTC and AGs and a limited private
right of action in data privacy legislation. 175
VI. CONCLUSION
Preemption of state law may be a key component of effective
federal privacy legislation. 176
Notwithstanding the benefits of
preemption, lawmakers should only include a provision that preempts
state privacy laws if the federal privacy bill includes other essential
elements. 177 These elements include a broad definition of personal data,
robust user control rights, expanded FTC powers, AG enforcement rights,
and a limited private right of action. 178 Otherwise, federal privacy
legislation that lacks these safeguards and preempts existing state laws is
“a watered-down bill that gives the appearance of protecting
consumers.” 179 Ultimately, lawmakers will need to combine these key

171. See id. at 798 (explaining difficulties injured consumers face in pursuing privacyrelated litigation); see, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft
Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding claimant failed to present “injury in fact”).
172. See Citron, supra note 23, at 798 (addressing challenges for plaintiffs bringing
privacy torts such as “intrusion on seclusion, public disclosure of private fact, false light, and
misappropriation of image . . . .”).
173. Id.
174. See Hendel & Lima, supra note 29 (addressing private right of action in federal
privacy law as an effective legal mechanism for accountability).
175. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (considering important issues and
protections that lawmakers must consider for federal privacy legislation); see also Hendel &
Lima, supra note 29 (addressing consumer protections to include in future federal privacy
law).
176. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 945 (explaining various approaches to preemption in
context of privacy law).
177. Id.
178. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (evaluating consumer protections that
legislators should include in federal data privacy law).
179. See Levitt & Keller, supra note 44 (explaining data privacy provisions that future
federal legislation should include like a private right of action); see also Schwartz, supra note
21, at 945 (discussing different perspectives on preemption of state data privacy laws).
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points to strike a balance between robust consumer protections and
flexibility for companies to continue their operations and to innovate. 180
Future data privacy law should include mechanisms for
companies to provide transparency and control to consumers over their
personal data without being overly prescriptive in how companies should
achieve these goals. 181 For instance, legislators should draft a provision
that requires companies to publish a data use policy that is easy for the
average person to understand, as the Data Control Act does. 182 Like the
Data Control Act, this privacy policy requirement should also compel
companies to explain the ways in which they will use consumer data. 183
Regulators, consumer advocates, and academics can hold companies
accountable by analyzing companies’ detailed, but easy-to-follow
privacy policies on behalf of consumers. 184 Additionally, lawmakers
should consider providing privacy protections for a broad range of
consumer data while differentiating between sensitive data and nonsensitive data. 185
Legislators should also avoid concentrating all enforcement
powers in one agency and should instead consider distributing
enforcement authority between the FTC, state AGs, and consumers
through a private right of action. 186 Overcentralization of power can
overburden the enforcing agency and lead to limited enforcement activity
by the agency. 187 Based on its experience in the data privacy sphere, the
FTC should be the main enforcement agency under any future federal
180. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (analyzing consumer rights that legislators
should include in federal privacy proposals).
181. Id.; Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Fed. Reg. at
48601 (explaining the benefits of a flexible outcome-based approach to privacy regulation).
182. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2019); see also Mehmet Munur
et al., Best Practices in Drafting Plain-Language and Layered Privacy Policies, INT’L ASS’N
PRIVACY PROFS. (Sept. 13, 2012), https://iapp.org/news/a/2012-09-13-best-practices-indrafting-plain-language-and-layered-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/KWB7-5HRL] (discussing
best practices for companies to draft privacy policies that are readable and understandable to
consumers).
183. See Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. §3(A)(3)(B) (2019) (imposing privacy
policy requirements for companies to implement).
184. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (explaining the benefits of privacy policies
to the public).
185. Id. (discussing the benefits of distinguishing between sensitive and non-sensitive
information in context of providing privacy protections).
186. Supra Part V; see also Citron, supra note 23, at 798 (“State enforcers are essential to
the efficient deterrence of privacy and data security violations given the increasing
marginalization of private law and the practical constraints on federal agencies.”).
187. See Citron, supra note 23, at 799–800 (explaining the limits the FTC faces in its
privacy enforcement activities).
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privacy law. 188 Nevertheless, state AGs should also have the power to
bring enforcement actions on behalf of their residents to ensure robust
enforcement. 189 Finally, wronged consumers should be able to engage in
external accountability through an appropriately limited private right of
action that can prevent nuisance litigation. 190
Ultimately, a
comprehensive federal privacy law that establishes strong, uniform
protections for data privacy will benefit industries like the financial
services sector by providing certainty, maintaining consumer trust, and
avoiding stifling industry innovation. 191
Although federal data privacy legislation will certainly ease the
burden of compliance on financial institutions by bringing uniformity on
a national level, this will not resolve all privacy issues. 192 Because many
financial services organizations must comply with the GDPR currently, a
comprehensive federal data privacy law will create compliance
challenges. 193 With the addition of U.S. federal legislation, companies
will have to navigate a new international patchwork of laws. 194
Uniformity of data privacy law at the national and international level
would be ideal in light of the borderless nature of the Internet. 195
Nevertheless, U.S. lawmakers should begin by establishing a national
standard that strikes a balance between protecting consumer data,
Supra Part V.
Supra Part V.
Supra Part V.
See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 1 (discussing the support of industry stakeholders,
including financial institutions, for the enactment of comprehensive federal privacy
legislation).
192. Sean Hackbarth, ‘A Patchwork Is Not Acceptable’: Making the Case for a National
Privacy Law, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM. (July 29, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.uschamber.com/series/above-the-fold/patchwork-not-acceptable-making-thecase-national-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/3RBF-WMXD] (discussing the benefits of a
uniform approach to data privacy in the U.S.).
193. See Elizabeth Schulze, The US Wants to Copy Europe’s Strict Data Privacy Law –
but
Only
Some
of
It,
CNBC
(May
23,
2019,
2:50
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/23/gdpr-one-year-on-ceos-politicians-push-for-us-federalprivacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/7P76-CNLB] (explaining the difficulty to comply with
privacy law of different jurisdictions).
194. See Feld, supra note 4 (evaluating GDPR impact on U.S. financial institutions).
195. See Jennifer H. Skees, The Problem of Patchwork Privacy, TECH LIBERATION (Aug.
15,
2018)
https://techliberation.com/2018/08/15/the-problem-of-patchwork-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/VWN5-5ZD6] (“The Internet by its very nature transcends states borders
and any state laws aimed at impacting privacy are likely to have national and global impact.”);
see also Liam Tung, GDPR, USA? Microsoft Says US Should Match the EU’s Digital Privacy
Law, ZDNET (May 21, 2019, 5:12 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/gdpr-usa-microsoftsays-us-should-match-the-eus-digital-privacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/KE4C-2M55]
(discussing the benefits of a strong GDPR-like law for the U.S.).
188.
189.
190.
191.
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industry innovation, and the freedom of small businesses. 196 This will
mean selecting beneficial parts of the GDPR to incorporate into federal
legislation, such as consumer rights to control their data, and discarding
other parts, like the GDPR’s rigid fine structure. 197 U.S. lawmakers
should avoid overwhelming U.S. industries with a burdensome data
privacy framework as stringent as the GDPR. 198
FARA SOUBOUTI *

196. See Schulze, supra note 193 (explaining GDPR consequences for U.S. companies).
197. See id. (addressing the compliance challenges associated with privacy law).
198. Id.; But see Tung, supra note 195 (evaluating the effects of the GDPR’s robust data

privacy protections on the industry).
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